VIETNAM HISTORY OF THE 2ND BATTALION 94TH ARTILLERY

‘FLEXIBLE’

The 2^nd Battalion 94^th Artillery Arrived in Vietnam on 18 October 1966 and was under operational control of the Third Marine Amphibious Group. The 2/94^th provided artillery support for the Third Marine Operations from Laos to the South China Sea.

"The willingness with which our young people are likely to serve in any war, no matter how justified, shall be proportional as to how they perceive the veterans of earlier wars were Treated and Appreciated by their Nation"

Actual Account from one of the first 2^nd Lieutenants assigned to the 2/94^th, A Battery:

The ship docked outside Saigon, or somewhere South and we found out the 2/94^th was going North to I Corps to be OPCON to the Marines. It took forever to get everyone else off-loaded so the 1/40th and we could go north on LST’s and unload in Chu Lai. We then discovered we were to keep A Battery in Chu Lai OPCON to the 11th Marines while the rest of the Battalion went to Dong Ha where there was another 175 battery (B Battery 6/27^th) waiting for them to be OPCON to the 12^th Marines as D Battery 2/94th. At that time 2/94^th had four firing batteries. Bastard A Battery in Chu Lai while B, C and D batteries were in the Dong Ha area.

We then started to join the "infusion" program with each battery shipping out and getting back in from other in-country units about half of our people so everyone did not rotate back home at the same time.

A Battery stayed with the 11^th Marines and was located in a compound with the Korean Marines south of Chu Lai. We never understood "firebases" as the Marines never called them that. I rotated a month with A Battery and a month with the 11th Marines as an Air Observer in the daytime and Regimental FDO at night. I was "Black coat 13" as an air observer. I ran as FO on a couple of "Rough Rider" convoys up or down the coast from Dong Ha to Quang Ngai. There were days when we had to lay on the floor of a H34 helicopter with a PRC 25 to call in air missions.

The Marines had A, B and C batteries made up of 105's, then one battery of 4.2 mortars mounted on old pack 75 frames (called Howtars). I think H Battery and M Battery were a battery of 155 towed. Then they had a battery of 155 "long toms" from WWII assigned to each Arty Regiment. Don't recall the range, but they were long shooters until the 2/94^th got there. Based on the distinction made between a howitzer and a gun, technically those long-toms and our 175’s were rifles.

Then later when the Army came in with the Americal Division we oriented their air observers before we went up to the 12th Marines. That was when there were more choppers available than we ever saw before. With the Marines we were usually with the C model Birddog fixed wing.

We had a tube blow up at our initial site when A Battery was assigned South of Chu Lai. When we were down south and the Americal division was formed, we immediately had to change two tubes into 8 inch and send some folks to Korea to get nuclear training which we all thought was dumb, but then they didn't ask us! The Marines had their 155 rifles, which was why they always called our guns "rifles" which always raised Army eyebrows. We did need the range which many times were the only thing that could reach to support Special Forces camps, or Khe Sanh later on.

I stayed with A Battery and, I think, in Sep/Oct 67 moved up to Dong Ha with the 12th Marines and convoyed to Camp Carroll and our A battery occupied the extreme Western part of the hill. I later took a platoon of guns to the Rockpile to better support Lang Vei and Khe Sanh.

The 175 battery assigned as D Battery 2/94^th was B Battery of the 6^th Battalion 27^th Artillery.

During this time period the 2/94th took part in Counteroffensive, Phase II. (07-01-66 to 05-31-67)

While the war in Vietnam may have slowed down for a time, the enemy would show that he was far from beaten. The US Forces and the 2/94^th would not find peace that easily.

This camp, just six miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ), is the base for the big guns of the 2^nd Battalion 94^th Artillery. Since the first rounds was fired by the battalion on Oct. 23, 1966, over 70,000 projectiles have been fired.

The artillery unit is the only Army unit of its type supporting the Marines. All fire missions in the area go through the 3^rd Marine Division.

The battalion has supported ten Marine operations. Including Operations Hastings and Prairie and the recent fighting in the DMZ.

The 175’s move around the province so that their 22 mile range can support the Marines, Special Forces, or the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as they are needed.

Batteries have gone to Con Thien and Gio Linh to fire deeper into North Vietnam.

The big guns have fired across the DMZ since February 22. Forward observers in Bird Dog spotter planes flown by Army, Marine, or Air Force pilots give the targets.

The US Forces opposing the North Vietnamese Army was a composite unit. The US Marines were the first to be committed. As the enemy force threat developed, the US Army deployed some of its Artillery units to reinforce the Marines and counter the growing threat. These Army Artillery units came under the operational control of the Commanding General of the III Marine Amphibious Group. The 2/94^th and 1/40^th was part of that commitment to the Marines in October 1966.

The enemy had grown from 23 main force battalions to 51 Battalions in I Corps. The US Forces were only seven (7) Marine Battalions along with the two (2) additional Army Artillery Battalions supplied to the Marines. It is believed the 1/44^th Dusters and Quads were already in support of those Marine units.

On 2 December 1966, C Battery fired the battalion’s 10,000^th round in Vietnam.

The battalion celebrated Christmas and New Years in Vietnam with a 48 and 72 hour cease fires, respectively. Toward the end of January 1967 the battalion began a series of platoon and battery displacements, which increased the firing load and consequently increased the burden of ammo resupply. B Battery was the first to be called upon. On 26 January 1967, B Battery displaced a platoon of guns to a position just Southwest of the Rockpile, to support an operation near the Laotian border. The movement occurred at night, the most dangerous time for movement in Vietnam and was the first such night movement of 175mm guns to date.

I remember the night of Jan. 26, 1967. Our squadron had two H-46s down in Laos, just across the border west of Khe Sanh. There were 31 Marines trapped and surrounded on Phou Loutoukou Ridge. You guys moved two 175s to the base of the Rockpile so that you could reach the ridge in Laos. Once you got to the Rockpile, you fired in support of the men on the ridge all night long. THANKS-A-MILLION.

From 8 - 12 February 1967, the US Forces declared cease-fire in honor of the Lunar New Year (TET) but the piece was broken on the third night when B Battery fired in support of a surrounded Marine platoon.

On 25 February 1967 General Westmoreland finally gave permission for the Marine and Army Artillery units to fire at military targets across the DMZ into the enemies homeland.

The NVA responded with heavy artillery barrages against Carroll, Gio Linh, and Con Thien.

B Battery was the first to displace to Gio Linh YD 218-732 just two miles South of the DMZ along Route 1, as part of Operation High Rise. Their mission was to fire pre-planned, unobserved targets in North Vietnam and the DMZ. The battery was accompanied by Battery C, 1/12^th Marines, a towed 105 battery and I company, 3^rd Battalion 4^th Marines, Infantry. They arrived at Gio Linh on 26 February 1967 and were hit with hostile mortar attack the first night, numbering 300 to 400 rounds. The nights of 28 February and 1-2 March 1967 saw attacks numbering over 750 rounds in seven attacks. Intermittent mortar rounds hit for the next two weeks, with the next large scale attack occurring on 20 March 1967 when the enemy hit with increased firepower of 105mm and 152mm artillery and 122mm rockets. An estimated 927 rounds fell that night and the battery sustained only one causality, the Number 3 Gun Chief, SSG Neal received a shrapnel wound in the head. The entire battery performed courageously under heavy enemy fire by returning much of the incoming with outgoing, and by exposing themselves to possible injury extinguishing fires on their guns.

While at Gio Linh, the battery forward observers, Lt. Smith and Lt. Beard participated in seven Recon patrols. While on patrol near the village of Tan Lich, Lt. Smith’s patrol made contact with an estimated company size enemy unit of the NVA. During a ten-hour period Lt. Smith called in over 2500 rounds of 105mm artillery fire.

Account of a 2/94^th Member that was part of the Camp Carroll Headquarters Battery contingent:

I joined the unit at Carroll on the last day of February 1967. On the night of, I believe 6 March; we took around 1000 rounds of 102mm rockets. These were called "Kartuchis" or "Stalin's Organs". In WWII they were fired in banks but the NVA used single tubes to fire the 102mm rockets. A total of six men were killed on Carroll and I believe at least one was from the 2/94^th. (May have been the first KIA suffered by the 2/94^th. Any info on this please notify the author.)

Later on and until the end of the war the NVA used 122mm Rockets against the firebase. Some were delayed fuse type.

On 6 March 1967, C Battery fired it’s 10,000^th round and by 31 March 1967 they had fired 14,115 rounds.

On 24 March 1967, B Battery was replaced at Gio Linh and returned to base camp at JJ Carroll. The entire battalion had been involved in Operation High Rise, the first Operation involving heavy artillery firing at targets in North Vietnam. The firing into North Vietnam proceeded with an intense rate in an effort to stifle the enemy supply channels from the North.

During late February - April of 1967 the 2/94^th guns on Carroll fired support for the provisional Artillery units at Gio Linh YD 218-732 and Con Thien YD 113-703. Like Gio Linh the Marine base at Con Thien was under heavy artillery barrages from the NVA. During these artillery duels it is estimated that 7,500 rounds were fired from J.J. Carroll by the 2/94^th.

Both Con Thien and Gio Linh were thought to be manned by contingents of the 9^th Marines and A Company 3^rd Tank Battalion. Elements of the 12^th and/or 13^th Marine Artillery were also present. And of course the Army unit on the DMZ that became synonymous with perimeter defense the 1^st Battalion 44^th Artillery’s 40mm Dusters and the Quad 50 caliber Machine Guns.

The increased ammunition output required the battalion ammunition section to work from dawn to dark delivering ammunition to all the batteries, with priority going to B Battery at Gio Linh. During the attack on B Battery on 20 March 1967, much of their powder was destroyed. The 12^th Marine Regiment directed a resupply convoy to be organized at 2400 hours. Service battery contributed six 5-ton trucks with trailers, one ¾ ton truck, and the battery commander’s jeep. Five hundred meters from Gio Linh the convoy was ambushed with a resulting loss of four 5 tons and trailers and the ¾ ton truck. As a result of the professional competence and the valor of the personnel of the battery no lives were lost. Capt. R. Powell, SSG W. Fernandez and SGT R. Zovistowski were awarded the bronze star with V device. SGT’s Seale and Poolo, along with PVT DR Woods were awarded the Army Commendation Medal with V device. SGT Seale was also awarded the Purple Heart along with SP4’s Kramb and Kerns.

The Mission of Service Battery Ammo Section was as follows:

To provide an adequate amount of ammunition to our firing batteries. Neither weather, terrain, or Charlie will stop our delivery. ‘They Call, We Haul’ the 147 lb Cong Buster, which enables Charlie to give his life. For our service is guaranteed. We accept all challenges! For we are the best.

B Battery 6^th Battalion 27^th Artillery (attached as D Battery) was rotated on 24 March 1967 to Gio Linh, which continued to come under enemy rocket, mortar, and artillery attacks. On 27 April 1967, D Battery underwent the heaviest single attack at Gio Linh, withstanding over 1,000 rounds of incoming. During the attacks the gun section returned the fire and destroyed two enemy artillery pieces and caused numerous secondary explosions. The attacks continued nightly, and on 30 April 1967, PFC Leonard Martin was killed in action while manning his gun. C Battery 2/94^th replaced D Battery (B Battery 6/27^th) at Gio Linh on 28 May 1967. During the sixteen days they occupied the position they received 38 attacks.

Once again during this period the personnel of the ammunition section distinguished themselves in maintaining ammunition resupply of 100 to 300 rounds per day. The enemy had begun shelling Gio Linh during the daylight hours and the ammunition section started out each day with the certain knowledge that they would be off-loading under fire.

They sustained several injuries and on 3 June 1967, SP4 Fleming was killed and PFC Honkon lost an arm and leg while off loading ammunition.

Meanwhile, B Battery back at JJ Carroll continued in Operation Prairie IV in support of the Marines, in action near the DMZ, Laotian Border, and for RECON elements in the field. From 16 May to 28 May 1967, B Battery fired in support of operation Hickory. In one instance during the operation, 9^th Marines had been fighting for 3 days to take Hill 117. B Battery massed fires with another battery, each firing 124 rounds enabling the infantry to walk up the hill without firing a round. During the period, B Battery fired 8,942 rounds. 8,576 of which were fired into North Vietnam. They wore out 19 gun tubes in the process.

As the activity increased in the Northern I Corps area the bulk of the Third Marine Division was moved to the I Corps area. The 2/94th supplied artillery support for Vietnamese Army as well as the Marines in their operations and perimeters around the DMZ. The 2/94^th supplied Forward Observers and Radio Operators to the South Vietnamese Army. One combined major operation during this time was called HASTINGS.

Ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam by the US Government. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces had to fight a war of attrition against the enemy, relying on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war. This set the rules of the war as decreed by Washington politics.

Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.

During this time period the 2/94th took part in four Campaigns against the NVA.

Counteroffensive, Phase III (06-01-67 to 01-29-68)
TET Counteroffensive (01-30-68 to 04-01-68)
Counteroffensive, Phase IV (04-02-68 to 06-30-68)

Counteroffensive, Phase V (07-01-68 to 11-01-68)

On 30 July 1967 the battalion had fired 84,940 rounds in RVN, out of which 47,425 nearly half of the total, had been fired into North Vietnam as part of Operation High Rise. Most of the missions fired into North Vietnam and the DMZ were unobserved and it was therefore difficult to obtain surveillance or battle damage assessments. The only way an artilleryman gets to know what effects for his hard work is having is by having surveillance, and the battalion had an excellent record in those few missions that were observed. Observers confirmed 240 enemy KIA and another 230 probable, 79 secondary explosions, 7 artillery pieces destroyed and 7 damaged, 40 bunkers destroyed and a long list of other targets destroyed or damaged.

The battalion celebrated their first anniversary since activation with organization day activities in June of 1967. A steak fry was held and awards were presented to the many men who had displayed their courage and fortitude during the past nine months in Vietnam. On 26 July 1967 a change of command ceremony was held. LTC Robert H. Kamstra accepted the battalion colors from LTC Richard G. Trefey. LTC Trefey, who had seen the battalion through activation, training, overseas transport and the first months in combat was reassigned to Headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam. The new battalion commander would see the battalion continue to receive constant enemy contact by mortar and artillery attacks, and would see the individual batteries and separate platoons displace to various locations to fire in support of several operations at once.

A Battery occupied Cumberland Fire Base on 1 August 1967 and fired the first round into the A Shau Valley, an NVA and VC stronghold. In seven days the battery fired 639 rounds in the A Shau Valley in support of Operation Cumberland. The battalion continued to fire into the Valley and North Vietnam throughout the summer months. Casualties remand surprisingly low considering the number of incoming rounds the battalion underwent. This was due in part to the poor training of the enemy and the inaccuracy of their weapons. However, it is due in part to the skill and hard work of the personnel of the battalion.

Anyway, we headed out the next morning for Khe Sahn where at that time things were relatively quiet. We remained there for approximately 1 1/2 months then headed down to Con Thien in August 1967.

You can't imagine how much we Marines on Hill 861 appreciated your 2/94^th Arty support. Frankly, the closer to our lines your rounds hit the better I liked it. That meant you were killing close-to-the-perimeter gooks.

NOTE: It is assumed that on or about the same time frame B Battery 6^th of the 27^th Artillery assigned as D Battery 2^nd Battalion 94^th Artillery was released. It is assumed the battery returned to the South and was under the OPCON of the 23^rd Artillery Group in the Quan Loi area.

On 23 December 1967, General Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, visited the battalion. The battalion commander escorted General Johnson through the area. He was shown the battalion headquarters area and B Battery where he observed a fire mission, fired by 175mm guns.

On 20 January 1968, the battalion received 27 rounds of incoming artillery fire. There were three WIA in C Battery, two buildings destroyed, one damaged, a 1-½ ton truck and an M-548 damaged, 6 M-14 rifles destroyed and 9 M-14 rifles damaged.

On 21 January 1968 the NVA began its attacks against Khe Sanh. Eight days before he was to launch his TET 68 offensive. The Base at Khe Sanh was defended by three Marine regiments from the 26^th Marines, a newly arrived 2^nd Marine Battalion, 13^th Marine 105mm and 155mm Artillery, Marine Tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion, G Battery from the 65^th Army Artillery a Quad unit, elements of the 1/44^th Army Artillery a Quad and Duster unit. The 2/94^th supplied fire support from outside the base area from its positions on Carroll and the Rockpile.

On 22 January 1968 the Marines also moved the 1^st Battalion 9^th Marines outside the Khe Sanh area where they took up positions at the rock quarry. This unit was to suffer extreme heavy casualties later at that position.

On 23 January 1968, the battalion VTR hit a mine while traveling along QL 9. There was one man wounded, the VTR was heavily damaged.

On 24 January 1968, the enemy ambushed an ammunition train enroute from JJ Carroll to Dong Ha Combat Base. Two men from B Battery along with several Marines were wounded and MEDEVAC’d. The threat of mines along the roads increased with several vehicles sustaining damage from mines along with several wounded as a result.

On 29 January the TET 68 offensive began. The Marines and Army Artillery were facing in I Corps: The 325C (which had been decimated early in the war by the Marines), the 304^th an Elite NVA Division from Hanoi, the 324^th Division, and the 320^th Division was just North of the Rockpile. The 325^th and the 304^th were known to have supporting Armour units from the 203^rd Armored Regiment. In addition the 68th and 164th NVA Artillery Regiments supported these attacking divisions.

On the morning of January 30^th, 1968 elements of the 320^th closed down Highway 9, which led to Dong Ha and out West to Khe Sanh. Camp Carroll started receiving incoming fire from an estimated 4 to 6 NVA firing batteries. Batteries consisted of 130’s and 122mm Rockets.

The next morning a B52 strike was ordered against the 320^th to the North and the North West. In addition fighter aircraft and the C130 gun ships (Puff) were called in to strike in the same general areas. During the B52 strike the NVA started shelling Camp Carroll and the men who told not be in their bunkers for fear of collapse during the B52 strike, did indeed use their bunkers.

You guys on the guns were always Johnny-on-the-spot when it came to fire support. Thank you very much. I recall a day when my squad escorted a FAO out northwest of Cam Lo. He called in an air strike up in the DMZ and then we just cooled our heels awhile. His radioman carried 2 PRC-25s (wow!) so he could hear both sides of a conversation. Somebody who was awfully excited called in a fire mission. He really rattled it off fast. The FAO said his call sign put him in Khe Sanh. He had to say it all over again because he spoke too fast to get it all. He was asked what his target was and he said, "I got a battalion o' gooks in the open and running." When asked how far away they were, he said, "Fifty meters and closing!" It seemed like only a second before we heard guns open up and the FDC announced, "They're on their way!" Now that's service.

There was one night, though, that y'all really annoyed me. We got the word that Carroll was going to be overrun. So we were pulled back from our front line and placed in a tight perimeter along dirt "road" directly in front of the 175s. I mean directly in front of the muzzles...about 20 feet!

Every time a gun captain would yell, "Stand by!" I'd cover both ears, open my mouth wide, and lay flat on the hard-packed adobe. Then the damned thing would explode, scooting me back 6-8 inches, knocking all the wind out of me. And of course the first gasp only sucked in burnt cordite. Gag a maggot! Even my helmet, set alongside me, would tumble a foot or so. The ground was so hard it broke our E-tools trying to scratch its surface. No joy there.

I must have dozed and missed a warning order because one cannon went off without my preparations. I think it popped my eardrum, 'cause I got a little blood from it. At that, I just picked up my gear, sat behind the gun, and the NVA and USMC be damned! Of course, nothing happened that night. All plans and intelligence must first be cleared through Hanoi!

You know the last stanza of the Marines Hymn? The part that goes, "If the Army or the Navy ever look on Heaven's scenes, they will find the streets are guarded by United States Marines"? What isn't said there is that we'll be pulling guard duty while the 2/94th Boys are busy knocking down the gates of Hell with precision fire!

A sincere "Semper Fi!" to you, and God bless you all.

(Note:

The 2/94th artillerymen on Carroll can never express in words the witnessed bravery shown, dedication to duty and each other the perimeter Marines at Carroll exemplified. With men such as these on our perimeter the hill was always secure. To borrow the slogan of the 108^th they did indeed perform, ‘Deeds Above Words’.)

B Battery fired in support of Hill 861 near Khe Sanh while under hostile attack. SSG Brum, CPL Robinson, PFC Hillis, PFC Willard were wounded while manning their guns. The support was well appreciated by the Marines near the hill and the enemy KIA was estimated at 130.

On 18 or 19 January 1968 (a day or two before the siege started) my Commanding Officer asked/ordered me to register targets in the ravines and likely approaches around 861. I registered and got target numbers from the 105's, 155's and the 8 inch guns at the base. In addition, I registered some targets on the northern slope of 861 using the 175's at Carroll. To this day, I still remember their call sign -- it was Colorado 1/9 -- and I never did speak directly to them because of the distance -- 18+ miles. My words and theirs were relayed from the base.

We got all friendlies out of the northern end of the trench line and then I registered the targets. Must have been three or four targets in all. In each case, the final rounds hit less than 50 meters outside our last strand of wire and that's when I cease fired and asked for Target Numbers. Man, those bad boys certainly crunched into the hillside less than 75 yards from my position! I knew the rounds were on the way from the "shot" and "splash" calls, but they still made my teeth rattle.

They fired in support of us again on the night of 20 or 21 January 1968 and I remember 861A using the 2/94th in that early February NVA attacks. (Referenced above.)

One night in mid to late March, the NVA launched rocket after rocket into the base. These 122's were fired from behind 881N and they had to travel almost directly over 861 on their way to the base. I called Colorado 1/9 (through the relay) and gave them the grid squares of the two launch sites behind 881N. My request was that they saturate both grid squares in order to stop this huge, on-going barrage. These grid squares were 1000's of meters from us and would have been max range for the 175's but I felt that just reaching out there would cause the NVA to stop.

Less than three minutes later I was told that the first rounds were on the way. Within seconds, WHAM! WHAM! WHAM!

Three or four rounds impacted less than 50 yards outside our wire! Scared the living hell out of all of us in the bunkers and the trench line. We even had a Listening Post right outside the last strands of wire, and those three guys must have shit their pants. Immediate "Check fire" on my part...one more round hit...then all was quiet.

Somehow, the 175mm people thought I had called for my target numbers to be fired, and they responded. Imagine, two and a half months after they were registered, and with no adjustments, and with cold tubes, and from over 18 miles. Those shells hit right outside our wire! A phenomenal display of shooting that I have never, ever forgotten even 32 years later. We got the Check Fire...corrected by a half a dozen grid squares, and they resumed firing. That's my memory of the big guns at Camp Carroll. I just realized that it was 32 years ago today or tomorrow that I registered those guns.

I can tell you one more thing, having been in the FSCC center that night. The night the NVA tried to take hill 861, they blew a few big holes in the wire and were inside the wire before anyone new it. The radioman up there was screaming at the top of his lungs to get some f___ing arty up there, that they were being overrun. Our 05's and 55's were shooting all kinds of missions that night so the Colonel had the 175's concentrate all their fire on one side of the hill that had a big hole in the wire. The fire from the 175's kept the NVA off that side of the hill so we could deal with another side and push the NVA out, which we did. When it was over the Colonel said the 175's, by denying that flank to the enemy probably saved the hill.

I know a lot is said about air power and I sure saw a lot of it during the siege but I will go to the grave knowing it was artillery that saved our Asses. I will take a battalion of artillery over an air wing anytime, anywhere. Artillery is with you 24 hrs a day and is still KING of the Battlefield!!

"THE MISSION OF THIS SECTION,

IS DESIGNED TO GIVE THE ENEMY SOLDIER

THE GREATEST OPPORTUNITY

TO GIVE HIS LIFE FOR HIS COUNTRY"

During this time some 2/94th 175mm guns were converted to 8-inch guns.

The Commanding Officer was Lieutenant Colonel Kamastra and the XO was believed to be Major Riddel or Major Fleming.

In March of 1968 the 2/94th joined the newly formed 108^th Artillery Group under 1^st Field Forces Command.

On 19 February 1968, SP4 Williams of B Battery was killed in a heavy artillery and rocket attack. During the same attack Headquarters Battery received two KIA’s, PFC Hornbaker and SP4 Wright, and one serious WIA. (Note: It is thought the author remembered the WIA’s last name was DeCosta. He had severe head wounds and later wrote back that he was recovering from those wounds.)

Enemy attacks continued to be very heavy throughout February and March 1968, resulting in a great deal of damage to equipment and positions, but without further casualties.

During Operation PEGASUS the 2/94th at Carroll and the Rockpile supported the 1st Air Cav’s breakout convoy along its way and during its operations.

About 25 Mar 1968 the relief column was observed by the Marines and Army units on Carroll down on Highway 9 on its way to the Rockpile and LZ Stud and on to Khe Sanh.

On the morning of 1 April 1968, the Marines started moving north along Highway 9 towards Khe Sanh from LZ Stud. Several Fire Missions were shot in support of the Marines to protect their movement. The clap of thunder of the artillery could be heard coming from Camp Carroll, the Rockpile, and LZ Stud. Fire Missions were being fired to clear a path for the infantry assault elements and close support artillery units.

After many weeks of siege, the enemy was finally driven back from Khe Sanh. The defense cost a great many American lives, but the enemy was hit even harder. The next few months would see a substantial drop in enemy activity as he regrouped and avoided confrontation in order to build up his forces. The successful defense of Khe Sanh was a significant page in the Vietnam chronicle. While the outpost itself would later be abandon, the success proved that the determined US Forces would not accept defeat in Vietnam. Though militarily superior, the US Forces had been sustaining heavy causalities as a result of the excellently deployed guerrilla forces of the VC and NVA. There was growing opinion that the guerrilla force could never be overcome. Though the war was far from over, Charlie’s reputation as an incredible fighter was beginning to suffer.

During these artillery battles the 2/94th suffered causalities from all batteries on Carroll. From a Battalion Surgeon that was with 3^rd Battalion 9^th Marines information indicates there were casualties in the 2/94th crews at the Rockpile as well. (Batteries unknown)

The report from FDC showed our guns were right on target this month. They completely wiped out 2 villages and took a total of 4 KIA’s. Along with that they knocked out 2 Arty pieces, a rocket position and numerous trucks.

This month we pay special tribute to SP5 Paul Meyer, our senior track mechanic and SP4 Lowell Hill our Arty mechanic. Through their tireless efforts they keep the guns up; therefore, helped complete the mission. Not to be forgotten are the hard working gun sections.

On 18 August 1968, A Battery fired the battalion’s 200,000 round. LTG Stiwell, Commanding General, XXIV Corps, visited the battery and helped pull the lanyard.

On September 10 1968, the communications bunker in B Battery was hit by NVA 152mm artillery during a shelling of Camp Carroll killing seven enlisted 2/94th personnel and wounding two. SP4 Michael Stoffers was one of the wounded. The other wounded enlisted man was the switchboard operator, name unknown at this time. Two of the 2/94th personnel killed were SP4 Harold Moseley from Arkansas and SGT Preston from Kentucky. The other five names are not known at this time. SP4 Moseley was awarded the Army Bronze Star Medal with V for Valor as he tried to keep the communications open.

On October 4 1968, A Battery road marched to Ca Lu and occupied a firing position there in order to support the Marines during Operation Nanking. They remained at Ca Lu until 14 October 1968, when they returned to Dong Ha. Through out the rest of the month the battery relentlessly pounded enemy positions in North Vietnam and received praise from the 108^th Group as being the most effective heavy artillery in the Group.

During this time period the 2/94th took part in Counteroffensive, Phase VI (11-02-68 to 02-22-69)

On 1 November 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson imposed a halt to the bombing of the North, which also curtailed the use of heavy artillery. The cutback in firing allowed all the batteries to improve bunkers, living areas, and their positions in general. The improvement in the facilities helped the celebration of Thanksgiving and Christmas to pass more comfortably and pleasantly.

On 30 November 1968, command was passed from LTC Brister to LTC Thomas E. Courant. In a few weeks the new battalion commander would see the entire battalion move to new positions, beginning with Headquarters moving to LZ Nancy on 3 December 1968.

In December 1968, A Battery retubed from a 175mm battery to an 8 inch battery. On 28 December 1968 they road marched 40 miles to the their new base camp at LZ Sally, five miles North of Hue on QL1. B Battery had already moved to C1 on 12 December 1968.

December 1968 marked the closing of Camp JJ Carroll by the Marines of the 3^rd Marine Division. The abandonment of the base was not a de-escalation but rather a shift in power. Since the closing of Khe Sanh in June of 1968, the push had been toward the establishment of mobile mountain top artillery bases rather than static positions.

During this time period the 2/94th took part in Winter-Spring (11-01-69 to 04-30-70)

During this time period the 2/94th took part in Sanctuary Counteroffensive (05-01-70 to 06-30-70)

The New Year and early months of 1969 would see a continuation of the light enemy contact by the 2^nd Battalion 94th Artillery. Much of the firing was in support of the 101^st Airborne Division, who was coming in contact with the enemy on their search and clear operations. In January 1969, all batteries underwent CMMI’s and passed satisfactorily. On 28 February 1969, C Battery joined B Battery at C1. While operating from C1, C Battery was the second Army artillery battery to fire into the northern portion of the DMZ since the bombing halt of 1 November 1968. On 31 March 1969, C Battery returned to LZ Nancy. Previously on 15 March 1969, Headquarters Battery came under ground attack at LZ Nancy, receiving 80 to 90 rounds of RPG and mortar fire.

After moving from C1 to Dong Ha, B Battery became the second battery to retube and become an 8 inch howitzer battery.

The battalion continued to receive very little enemy contact. The pace of the war was gradually slowing and the first troop level reductions were being planned. The battalion was receiving numerous commitments for forward observer parties to accompany troops on their operations. There was a minimum of enemy activity throughout the beginning of the year and on into September. The batteries spent most of their time strengthening defense perimeters with increased work on perimeter concertina barbed wire and trip flares. Cyclone fencing was added to many perimeter bunkers to protect against enemy RPG’s. Roofs were added to the bunkers to protect against rain and fighting positions were enclosed also. Additional employment of Fougasse and claymore mines completed the improvements.

During the summer and fall of 1969 the battalion position received rocket and mortar rounds once or twice a week. Only a few rounds were received each time and damage was negative or minor with no casualties.

On 14 July 1969, LTC William H. Krueger assumed command from LTC Courant. Fourteen days later the new battalion commandeer saw the battalion receive their Annual General Inspection. All batteries received superior ratings in all areas.

Enemy rockets continued to be sporadic with a few rounds impacting in and around positions every few days. On 23 October 1969, one rocket hit a Marine area, resulting in two KIA’s, eight WIA’s seven of whom were evacuated in critical condition.

On 31 October 1969, Gun #4 of A Battery fired the battalions 300,000^th round. Present for the ceremony were LTG Melvin Zais, Commanding General XXIV Corps, BG Allan G. Pixen, Commanding General XXIV Corps Artillery, COL R.C. Cartwright, Commanding Officer, 108^th Artillery Group and COL Moore, 101^st Division Artillery.

On 14 November 1969, SP5 O. Thompson, chief computer operator for Charlie Battery was killed when the APC he was riding on overturned and crushed him.

At the beginning of November 1969, Headquarters Battery began preparing for movement to Camp Evans on 5 December 1969. Service Battery would also move to Camp Evans where the two batteries would be co-located. The would remain in this position until 24 February 1970 when the would move into joint location at Dong Ha Combat Base.

On 2 January 1970, LTC James N. Hale replaced LTC Krueger as Battalion Commander. LTC Kruger was reassigned to G-3, USARV. LTC Hale’s stay with the 2/94^th was short lived. On 3 February 1970 he departed and was reassigned to the 1/5^th Infantry while Major Ferguson took command of the battalion.

The battalion was receiving almost no enemy activity, except for the ever present danger of land mines. Several injuries were received in various incidents and road travel was very hazardous. On 29 April 1970 the breach block of a 175mm gun in A Battery blew off during a fire mission, killing two and wounding three others. The battery fought for six hours to put out the flames and move powder and projectiles which were in close proximity of the burning gun.

Since the first of the year B Battery participated in three artillery raids, at LZ Anne (7-10 January 1970), LZ Bastogne (23-25 January 1970), and the Rockpile (10-15 March 1970). The unit suffered one causality when Gun #3 struck a mine returning from the raid at LZ Anne.

On 10 February 1970 B Battery received a CMMI, and received a 94% the highest score for any unit in I corps. Three days later B Battery displaced to the old Marine base camp, JJ Carroll.

On 1 March 1970 the battalion received it’s eighth battalion commander since reactivation. LTC Edward G. Brantley assumed command of one of the finest artillery units in the US Army.

Rocket and mortar attacks occurred with frequently during the period 1-8 may 1970. JJ Carroll, C1, and Dong Ha Combat Base all received incoming during this period. On 17 May 1970, an NVA platoon was sighted outside the perimeter at JJ Carroll. The platoon fired approximately 10-12 RPG rounds and 75-80 mortar rounds during the action. Dusters and M79 fire dispersed the platoon and no serious damage was reported.

On 18 May 1970, the battalion participated in a 24 hour cease fire in honor of Buddha’s birthday, commencing at 1200 hours.

During this time period the 2/94th took part in Counteroffensive, Phase VII (07-01-70 to 06-30-71)

Lam Son 719 was conducted out of I Corps by Vietnamese troops with US fire and air support. Their object was to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to destroy enemy bases at Techepone, Laos.

The operation consisted of four phases.

In Phases I, called Operation DEWEY CANYON II, the 1st Brigade, US 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) occupied the Khe Sanh area and cleared Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. In the meantime, the US 101st Airborne Division conducted diversionary operations in the A Shau Valley. The US 45th Engineer Group had the mission of repairing Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. This lasted from 30 January to 7 February 1971.

During Phase II US forces continued to provide fire support, helilift, and tactical and strategic air support for ARVN units. This phase was 8 February to March 1971.

Phase III ran from March to 16 March 1971;

Phase IV was the withdrawal phase. Faced with mounting losses, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, the commander of the invasion forces, decided to cut short the operation and ordered a withdrawal.

On 1 February 1971, A Battery displaced from LZ Vandergrift to the vicinity of FSB Sheppard. On 4 February 1971 the entire battalion displaced to positions in the vicinity of Lang Bu and was given a new mission of GSR ARVN I Corps Artillery, with priority fires to the 1^st ARVN Airborne Division.

An actual account of a motor maintenance sergeant with B/2/94^th during the pull out on March 18 1971.

Choppered into FSB Flexible, near Lang Vei. From there to Lao Bao. We built our firebase from scratch with some Engineers. It was called Firebase Style. A Battery was across QL9.

I was most definitely there for the pull out incident on 3-18-1971. The memories are not crystal clear but they are in living color. The order was given to tear down all the bunkers. As I remember there were only two bunkers that were not torn down, the one for the maintenance section and bunker close to the FDC. That maintenance bunker took at least three direct hits that afternoon. I fell into a crater left when one of the deuce and half’s left along with SP4 Mike Williams. I got Mike to the maintenance bunker and went back out between incoming rounds to assist the medivacs when they finally could land. I remember vividly it took 4 seconds from the initial round being fired until impact and that probably save me as I hit the ground each 3 ½ seconds. Loaded a bunch of guys into the dust offs. One was Country Boy with a badly broken leg and another FDC soldier with a deep thigh wound. When the rounds started coming in I was in the middle of the trail near a water buffalo trailer. The round left the trailer spewing water everywhere. No one I have spoken with quite understands the 3/18/71 incident.

An actual account of a Sergeant of the Guard with B/2/94^th during the pull out on March 18 1971.

We built the bunker when we got there next to the perimeter. It was a 5 x 7 by 3 foot deep with a steel roof and 5 foot of sandbags on top of that. I was short (60 days) and wanted to get out of there alive. As I was Sergeant of the Guard, I would make my hourly rounds and fill sand bags in between. As I remember, we always got hit from noon till 5pm so evenings were usually quiet so we built it at night.

Nothing much happened until everyone tore down and then all hell broke loose. People were just laying out in the open getting nailed. PFC Mike Williams did come to my bunker and sat with his back towards me directly between my legs. Fourteen of us crowded into that bunker and I know we took many mortar hits and for sure one direct 122mm rocket. Everything went completely black and for some reason we all started reciting the Lords Prayer. People were crapping their pants and throwing up on themselves but all 14 of us made it out alive. I am very proud of that bunker.

When we left, that bunker was not tore down as we didn't have the time. I was told a week later by Captain Faber that the bunker had also saved a Cobra pilot who had been shot down by our deserted area and had made it to the bunker until he could be picked-up.

The Laos operation was basically screwed. We had lots of incoming from NVA Arty units (they had 152mm gun howitzers which out ranged our 8 inch guns) and the 8^th Bn 4^th Artillery got smoked big time. B/2/94 basically got wiped out on 18 March 71 when they followed a screwed up order from battalion to line up on the road while under observed artillery fire. It wasn't a pretty sight. Interesting how they cover that screw up in the official unit history though.

(Note: The Official rational was the Army wanted a more mobile mountain top artillery. The author believes the Army and the Military in general did not realize how effective the 175’s with overlapping fire from the firebases on the DMZ would be on the enemy. Especially in a narrow country like Vietnam. With the 94^th Battalion alone firing half a million rounds. The relatively new 175 inventory depleted rapidly. Including the tubes which had a change rate on the average of 600 rounds fired. If you can steel rain on the enemy from the sea to Laos, most of Quang Tri Province, and hit the enemies convoys in North Vietnam with 3 or 4 fixed positions why move, why more mobile? Not much fun being in an Artillery dual, but when all you can do is sit and take it this becomes a nightmare. These bases had the all the coverage Washington and the politics of the day would allow the American forces to fight in.

It is known however that the 175’s were vulnerable to short range attacks early on in the war as the 175’s could only shoot short about 5 miles. That is one reason why most provisional artillery units had Marine or Army 105’s to support the big guns. In some cases both 105’s and 155’s were used.

From Mai Loc C Battery then moved to Vandergrift and went after NVA supplies, etc. in the very Northwestern part of RVN using Air Observers. C Battery shared the load with the Air Force, as the Battery stopped firing when the Air Force was dropping bombs. C Battery got it’s share of secondary explosions.

We fired about 1000 rounds. We actually had 2 guns attached to our battery from 1/39th FA. All tubes were 175mm giving us a six gun 175 battery. Not bad. At Vandergrift, we were the only ones there other than a ARVN 105 mm Battery just down the road. It was pretty lonely there. We were probably there about four days. As I was FDO, I was with advance party, back to FSB Birmingham. I believe that our mission to Vandergrift may have been the last westward deployment of 175mm in RVN in I Corps. I believe that JJ Carroll may have been abandoned at that point of time. The 8/4th was a month from stand down.

Just for the record, on the way back to the coast, a 2^nd Lt, who I have not been able to locate, was promoted by LTC Ganahl, while enroute. LTC Ganahl, by helicopter, found us and stopped us to perform the promotion some where on QL 9.

During the late Summer of 71, C Battery was a show Battery to all sorts of dignitaries. I believe I had the Deputy Commander of Vietnam in my FDC at one time or another. They came with platoons of Lieutenant Colonels carrying briefcases. I guess the brass needed something to do, as there were a lot less people to look after.

During this time period the 2/94th took part in Consolidation I. (07-01-71 to 11-30-71)

Rakkasan YD 490-198 Hill 493, Dong Cung Cap.

This is thought to be the last major action the 2/94th was asked to serve in. Other than H and I or opportunity targets.

The official departing date for the 2^nd Battalion 94^th Artillery from Vietnam is 21 April 1972.

During its 6 year service in South Vietnam the 2^nd Battalion 94^th Artillery, 108^th Artillery Group was under Operational Control of the Third Marine Amphibious Group, the XXIV Corps, the 101^st Airborne, and the 196^th Light Infantry Brigade, 1^st Marine Division.

101^st Airborne 196^th Light Infantry Brigade 3^rd Marine Division

XXIV CORPS 108^th Artillery Group 1^st Marine Division

The 2/94th served in both 1^st Field Forces and 2^nd Field Forces.

1^st 2^nd

The 2/94th participated in 14 Campaigns.

The 2/94th was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation from the Department of the Navy.

As part of the 108^th Artillery Group the 2/94th was awarded the Vietnamese Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry w/Palm.

Joseph Stalin during WW2 after he witnessed what artillery could accomplish; Fire day or night, fire in bad weather, fire at a minutes notice, stated:

The 175’s of the 2^nd Battalion 94^th Artillery

and her companion Battalion

the 8^th Battalion 4^th Artillery were surely

‘The Long Arm of that God in I Corps’

Republic of South Vietnam

18 October 1966

to

21 April 1972

My personal thanks and appreciation go to the following Army and Marine personnel:

Marine: Dennis Mannion, Larry Mccartney, Earl Clark, Earle Breeding, Dave Byran, Tom Walker, Dennis Thun, Ron Durham, Charles Barnes, Al Moring, William Ryan, Jim Gutierrez, Charles Frugoni, Marion Sturkey

To see members of the 2/94th and some of their Vietnam photographs and personal stories see:

http://www.willpete.com/2nd_battalion_94th_artillery.htm

To see members of the 8/4th and some of their Vietnam photographs and personal stories see:

http://www.willpete.com/8th_battalion_4th_artillery.htm

http://www.egroups.com/group/8-4-arty

The fact the Veteran’s Administration stalled, tried to cover up, and plausibly deny the pain and suffering the Veteran’s, the Veteran’s family, and the Veteran’s children suffered with this poisoning.

The fact that the Veteran’s had to have a law suit to even get the wonderful government to listen is despicable in its’ self. The fact when they did agree there was a problem the veteran’s wonderful lawyers got half of the settlement.

Yet the wonderful government gives out billions of dollars each year to people who do not want to work much less fight for their country. Then we hear these people are not even required to pick up a broom and help keep the country clean because it is below their dignity.

So I guess killing or being killed or being wounded for the rest of your life or having your children born malformed or sickly is OK. Dying a slow agonizing death from some sort of cancer is OK as far as dignity goes. At least that is according to the US Government and the politicians.

Now the Veterans Administration is not even helping the GI fill out all the paper work involved with any claim. Or to help in running the legal gauntlets the government has allowed to be put in the pathway.

So why is there a Veterans Administration? If they are not going to help the GI’s then terminate them and close down the Administration and let them find some real work for a change.

World War II
Normandy
Northern France
Rhineland
Ardennes-Alsace
Central Europe

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered ARDENNES

French Croix de Guerre with Palm, World War II, Streamer embroidered NORMANDY

French Croix de Guerre with Palm, World War II, Streamer embroidered MOSELLE RIVER

French Croix de Guerre, World War II, Fourragere

http://www.geocities.com/afa94th/